

us to proceed with the business of the Senate.

RECOGNITION OF THE ACTING MINORITY LEADER

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The deputy Democratic leader.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, one question I have gotten over here several times, and I have raised this issue on the floor, Senator MCCONNELL has said on two separate occasions that a week from this Monday, we will be working. People are changing schedules and all.

My personal feeling is we should be working. I hope the leader, whatever the final decision—I understand the preliminary decision is we would be working a week from Monday, more so than just 5 o'clock at night.

If we are to have any hope of getting out of here in time for important events such as people's birthdays and events of that nature, we have to really move forward. I say that actually recognizing the Presiding Officer has a very important date coming up—it is the 18th or 20th, or something like that.

Seriously, if we can have a signoff on what you are going to do that day, it would be important to everybody.

Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, in response, through the Chair, the intention right now is to work Monday, make that a full working day. As we finished last night at about midnight, a lot of people were saying we can't work any harder than what we are doing right now in terms of taking these bills one by one, and that is the way we are going to have to work, unfortunately—or fortunately—in order to complete what we have before us; thus the intentions for the day before Veterans Day.

The real issue, obviously, for our colleagues, because they understand, but for others who are listening to understand, Veterans Day is a day we want to be able to honor, and a lot of people will have to change their plans because they have to be flying to the west coast. But I want to make it clear our intention is to stay here and work. In truth, that is what the people around the country expect us to do. We have work right now. We have the Nation's business before us, in terms of the appropriations bills, the many conference reports that we are waiting for, the very important conference in terms of energy and Medicare, which is underway. So it is critical that we continue work on that Monday.

It is my intention, of course, on Veterans Day, to be able to respect that day accordingly, as we go forward. I think we will be able to announce more about that in the early part of next week. The schedule constantly changes. I was very hopeful we could complete this Internet tax issue. That was really our goal. We worked very hard, but, again, out of consideration for our Members, we have had to move that forward a week. We intend to finish that the end of next week, and it is critical we do so.

It is important for our colleagues to understand because about this time of the year everybody is sort of sitting and waiting to see who is going to make the next move. At this point, we are trying to wrap everything up for the session. It means everybody needs to recognize decisions have to be made, very tough decisions. I am speaking in part to the conferees who are addressing issues right now. There are one or two outstanding issues in these conferences. Now is the time to make those decisions. If not, we will be here all the way up to Thanksgiving, and after Thanksgiving, and up to the December holidays. That is really unacceptable to me. But now is the time to wrap things up, over these next several weeks.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I have said on the floor previously that the veterans of America recognize how important our work is here. So much that we do reflects on these different programs. I also think if things are as difficult as they appear, we may have to do something on that Tuesday. That will certainly be up to the leader. But I also recognize that other than Senator FRIST and Senator DASCHLE, no one has had a more difficult job these last few weeks than the Presiding Officer and Senator BYRD. Trying to marshal through these appropriations bills is extremely difficult.

But we have made really good progress. To think we have been able in just the last few weeks to do as much as we have here on the Senate floor with the appropriations bills is significant. Debating the Interior appropriations conference report this coming Monday is also important. I think there is light at end of the tunnel. With the chairman cajoling, along with the Presiding Officer, we can continue to make progress.

RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, leadership time is reserved.

MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, there will now be a period of morning business with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECALL THE IRAQI ARMY

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, last week a memorandum on the war on ter-

rorism from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to his top subordinates was leaked to the press. In that memo, Secretary Rumsfeld asked a number of questions, including the following: Is our current situation such that "the harder we work, the behinder we get?" Then he asked: "What else should we be considering?"

Well, I am dismayed that Secretary Rumsfeld says publicly something so differently than what he has said privately. I am glad he is looking for new direction since our post-Saddam policy is not working well, given the sustained and increasing attacks on our forces.

Secretary Rumsfeld asked—again—"What else should we be considering?" Well, the President of the Iraqi Governing Council has made a specific recommendation for us to consider: that the regular Iraqi Army units be called up to assist our troops in providing security for the reconstruction of their country.

Surely it is worthy of our consideration, when Iyad Alawi, this month's serving President of the Iraqi Governing Council—the 25-member body selected by the United States to represent the Iraqi people—is making a suggestion to change course.

He wrote an important opinion piece entitled "America Must Let Iraq Rebuild Itself," which was published by the New York Times on October 19. The main premise of the article is that "ultimately, only Iraqis themselves can restore security, rebuild national institutions, enact a constitution and elect a democratic government."

I believe all of us would agree with that premise. For Mr. Alawi, the vital step is to "call up the Iraqi Army and the national police force [for] at least up to the mid-officer level" to deal with the insecurity and chaos in the country.

Mr. Alawi believes the Iraqi officer corps will have to be vetted to remove those who have committed crimes under the old regime. He points out that most of the Iraqi Army's soldiers are "Iraqi patriots who chose not fight for Saddam Hussein" and "would probably return to their units and contribute to their country's future." He argues that it would be "much easier and quicker to retrain and reequip them within their existing organizational structure than to start from scratch."

Mr. Alawi argues that these steps would not only relieve the burden on American troops but also would gain substantial good will among Iraqis.

Tom Friedman, writing in the New York Times, on October 23, is of a similar mind. He urges the administration to declare the following: "We thank all the nations who offered troops, but we think the Iraqi people can and must secure their own country. So we're inviting all former Iraqi Army soldiers (not Republican Guards) to report back to duty. For every two Iraqi battalions that return to duty (they can weed out

their own bad apples), we will withdraw an American one. So Iraqis can liberate themselves. Our motto is Iraq for the Iraqis."

That is from Tom Friedman, who has been a very strong supporter of the administration's military actions in Iraq and the decision to attack Iraq.

The administration and the Coalition Provisional Authority have taken a different tack in reorganizing Iraqi security, particularly with regard to the Iraqi Army. They are essentially starting from scratch to build a completely new Army of 40,000 people who are being trained and equipped as a motorized infantry.

The goal is to form nine brigades by the end of 2004, but thus far only one battalion of 750 soldiers has been trained and equipped.

Additionally, the Coalition Provisional Authority is creating an Iraqi border patrol force, only 5,000 to date, with the need to expand to more than 20,000 sometime in the future. A 20,000-person Facilities Protection Service is intended to take over security at fixed site locations from coalition forces, and an Iraqi civil defense corps of 6,600, expanding to more than 15,000 in 2004, is being integrated into coalition military units to provide local intelligence and help with security patrolling.

While I have some questions regarding the need for four distinct security forces, including a new Iraqi Army, in addition to a new national police force, I am open to arguments that this approach to building a new army may be desirable in the long run. A better educated, trained, equipped, and motivated army, whose members are more representative of the diverse Iraqi population, and which was created expressly to serve the people of the new Iraqi state, may be more ideal.

However, in the short term, I believe Mr. Alawi's recommendation to reconstitute units of the old regular army is surely worthy of consideration. No one, including Mr. Alawi, argues for a continued role for those portions of the old army that were part of the repressive security apparatus of the Saddam regime—units such as the Special Security Guards, the Special Republican Guards, and the Fedayeen Saddam.

In fact, those units were created by Saddam because he did not trust his regular army. In that portion of the State Department-sponsored "The Future of Iraq Project," dealing with Iraqi Armed Forces, the Working Group that wrote this part of the report, discussed this issue.

They noted the following: "Saddam Hussein realized, with his sense of security, that he will not be able to earn the loyalty and trust of the army with its varied character in spite of many attempts to purify or clean the army from the disloyal elements—as he called them—in order for the army to become an army of ideology to protect the party and the revolution and defend the nation's values." They added that "Thus the army remained a

source of worry, suspicion and threat to Saddam; in spite of the fact that the army got into its many wars because Saddam desired it. There are some who think that the army was pushed into these wars to keep it continuously busy confronting outside aggressions." Finally and in view of these findings, the Working Group concluded that "In any event we think it necessary to keep the basic structure of the army, which can be easily rehabilitated. . . ."

That regular army, below the midofficer level, after vetting, could serve a useful role by putting trained Iraqi forces into the field to more quickly enhance overall security. The regular Iraqi Army was a sizable force of approximately 80,000 officers, 130,000 noncommissioned officers, and 400,000 conscript soldiers."

We probably made a mistake in formally disbanding the Iraqi army in May. I wonder if Ambassador Bremer doesn't tacitly believe the same, given the quick decision that was made by him shortly thereafter by agreeing to pay monthly allowances to officers and noncommissioned officers after the unrest that was unleashed by that decision.

Beginning in July, monthly payments were made according to a rank-based scale, ranging from \$50 for a noncommissioned officer to \$150 for a general, somewhat below the base pay for the various ranks. Additionally, a one-time \$40 stipend was paid to former conscripts. Since July, the Coalition Provisional Authority has paid from Iraqi funds approximately \$78 million to about 260,000 individuals and just over \$15 million to approximately 375,000 conscripts. The estimated cost for the stipend during the next year will be \$190 million, if payments continue throughout the year.

In other words, we know where the men and women—mainly men—in the Iraqi regular army are located. They came for those payments, and we know how to locate them, should we make a decision to reconstitute units of that Iraqi army.

That money was well spent. There is ample evidence from other conflicts that unemployed former soldiers can be a destabilizing and a disruptive influence, as some believe is currently the case in Iraq today. In view of the \$156 billion that is likely to be appropriated for U.S. military forces in Iraqi reconstruction in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, paying those sums to members of the old regular Iraqi army would be a modest expenditure.

But would it not make more sense to pay those sums to soldiers who are actually doing something? Would it not make sense to quickly reconstitute recently disbanded Iraqi regular army units to take on security tasks that are within their capabilities? Would it not be possible that recently disbanded Iraqi army units would be able to more quickly assume duties for which the border patrol, the facilities protection service, and the civil defense corps are

intended, including patrolling Iraqi streets with our own soldiers? Would this not more quickly give Iraqis the responsibility for and a stake in securing their own country? And, more importantly, wouldn't it be better for all concerned if primarily Iraqi soldiers and not Americans were acting to restore security in Iraq and dealing with those who would seek to disrupt it?

The Governing Council President thinks so.

I ask unanimous consent that an article written by the current President of the Iraqi Governing Council, Iyad Alawi, entitled "America Must Let Iraq Rebuild Itself," which appeared in the New York Times on October 19, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. DOLE). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. LEVIN. I asked Ambassador Bremer when we met with him: At a minimum, would he not raise this issue with the Governing Council to see whether or not the views of the President of the Governing Council, that the Iraqi army regular units should be reconstituted, represent the views of the Governing Council itself. We surely should listen to those views. These are the folks we put in office there as representing the Iraqi people. At a minimum, I urged Ambassador Bremer to find out formally from that Governing Council whether or not the President's views, as represented by this article in the New York Times—that the regular units of the army, properly vetted to make sure we don't hire old members of the Saddam leadership—should be reconstituted to help us maintain order and security in Iraq.

I believe Ambassador Bremer will in fact make that request of the Governing Council—not the request to reconstitute the army, because I don't think Ambassador Bremer is there yet, but the request of the Governing Council to see if they agree that it would be wise for those units below the mid-level officer level to be reconstituted, properly vetted, to help us on the streets of Baghdad and in the areas which are very dangerous, and to take some of the pressure off our troops to make us less of a target and to have Iraqis gradually but more quickly take over their own security so that we are not a lightning rod for the folks who are trying to destroy us.

I look forward to the response of the Governing Council of Iraq to Ambassador Bremer's request. We know that as a new Iraqi army is formed, some of the existing units will be retrained and equipped to expand that army. But it is critically important that we have this question put before that Governing Council. The creation of a new Iraqi army is going very slowly. We are at less than a thousand. We must move more quickly.

The question is, since most of the members who we are hiring for that

new army are members of the old army in any event, would it not be much quicker to reconstitute the units of that old army—again, below the mid-officer level, so we don't have the Saddam regime involved—would it not be much quicker to follow the suggestion of the President of the Governing Council, reconstitute the units and move on from there?

The Secretary of Defense asked, in his leaked memorandum, if what the U.S. is doing is enough and what else should be considered. I am glad he asked those questions. As I said before, I am sorry he has not said publicly what he said privately in terms of his doubts and concerns. But having said that, I am glad he is raising questions. I am glad he is asking questions about whether we should change course in some way.

I have written to the Secretary of Defense to solicit his views on Mr. Alawi's proposal. Again, I hope Ambassador Bremer does consult with the Iraqi Governing Council, seek their recommendations on this issue, and not only solicit their recommendations but seriously consider ways to formulate an integrated and comprehensive plan to move more quickly to involve Iraqis in their own security and in their overall governance.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Times, Oct. 19, 2003]
AMERICA MUST LET IRAQ REBUILD ITSELF
(By Iyad Alawi)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ.—No Iraqi will ever forget the momentous April day when a crowd of hundreds of cheering Baghdadis, helped by an American armored vehicle, pull the huge statue of Saddam Hussein to the ground. With this act, we tore down three decades of tyranny and repression and began building in its place a foundation for freedom, democracy and a better future for our children.

To see that this goal is achieved, the Bush administration has challenged me and my colleagues on the Iraqi Governing Council to draft a permanent constitution within six months and to move as quickly as possible to hold internationally monitored, free elections. We gladly accept that challenge, and welcome the vital assistance of the United Nations, through the Security Council resolution passed on Thursday, to see through to completion the enormous task ahead.

But we also realize that there are obstacles on Iraq's march toward democracy. In the months since Iraq was liberated, jubilation has given way to insecurity and chaos. When my fellow Iraqis finally go to the polls to elect their government, they must have confidence that state institutions are not only legitimate and independent, but robust enough to guarantee safety and civil rights. That is why the coalition and the council must take several immediate steps to establish these necessary conditions for the constitutional process to succeed.

First, it is vital to call up the Iraqi Army and the national police force, at least up to mid-officer level. The coalition's early decision to abolish the army and police was well intended, but it unfortunately resulted in a security vacuum that let criminals, diehards of the former regime and international terrorist flourish. And the coalition's plan to build a 20,000-member lightly armed force mostly responsible for security and border control could make poor use of a valuable re-

source: the 300,000 Iraqi soldiers who simply went home with their weapons in the face of the American-led invasion.

Most of these soldiers are Iraqi patriots who chose not to fight for Saddam Hussein. Americans should not confuse the Iraqi Army with the hated Republican Guard, which Saddam Hussein created precisely because he distrusted the legitimate military. In one simple process, the coalition authority can support the governing council to call the army back to its barracks for retraining and, ultimately, for redeployment. Most soldiers and their officers will proudly return to their units and contribute to their country's future.

The coalition and the Iraqi Interior Ministry can vet officers to remove those who committed crimes under the old regime, and then rapidly redeploy the most capable units to work with, and progressively relieve, American troops of security duties. Iraqi Army units have an established chain of command and esprit de corps. Not only can they be recalled to barracks immediately, but it would be much easier and quicker to retrain and re-equip them within their existing organizational structure than to start from scratch.

By supporting the recall of army units, the United States would not only speed the process of relieving the burden on its troops, it would also gain substantial good will in Iraq. In contrast, any American-led military presence, even if complemented by the United Nations, will never have the credibility and legitimacy that the Iraqi Army has among the people.

In addition, the Iraqi national police must also be recalled. Most Iraqi policemen—as opposed to Saddam Hussein's feared intelligence and security organs—are dedicated to law and order. The United States does not have the time or money to create a police force from the ground up, nor is it necessary, because we have a large, organized force that is ready and willing to serve.

Many other Iraqi governing institutions should also be reactivated by the governing council, with the support of the coalition authority. Special priority must be given to the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Finance, Oil and Education. The Iraqi bureaucracy must also be called back to work, although of course after screening to disqualify serious offenders of the former regime. Together, the council and the coalition leaders can modernize the state apparatus, phase out obsolete policies and practices, and encourage a new mindset of transparency and efficiency.

Finally, as security improves, Iraqi institutions are re-established and the constitutional drafting process is completed, the United States should support international recognition of Iraqi sovereignty. Then a recognized interim government could quickly present a popular referendum, under United Nations monitoring, on the new national constitution. It would be a grave mistake for the United States to hold out sovereignty and international recognition as the reward for passage of a constitution. Rather, making Iraqis once again a part of the international system is the prerequisite of successful reconstruction and a durable democratic system.

Iraqis are grateful for the tremendous efforts and sacrifices the United States is making on our behalf. Yet, ultimately, only Iraqis themselves can restore security, rebuild national institutions, enact a constitution and elect a democratic government. America must not rebuff Iraqis who are eager to have a stake in this intimate national process. Like any free people, we want to ensure that we are in control of our own destiny.

Mr. LEVIN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DEWINE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

HONORING OUR ARMED FORCES

Mr. DEWINE. Madam President, a week ago today, I came to the Senate floor to honor and to remember a young Ohio soldier who lost his life while bravely serving our Nation in Iraq. That young man, PFC Branden Oberleitner, had served proudly in the Army's 101st Airborne Division, based out of Fort Campbell, KY.

Today, I come again to the floor of the Senate to honor and to remember another young Ohio soldier who served proudly in the 101st Airborne Division, another young soldier who lost his life bravely defending our Nation and fighting to give a better life, freedom, and liberty to the people of Iraq.

Madam President, SGT Brett Thomas Christian was born on December 5, 1975. Growing up, Brett's life was not always easy. Like a lot of families, he and his mother Tess and brothers Sloan and Derek moved around a lot. As a young child, Brett was in and out of a number of schools, leaving old friends and making new ones each time. The family eventually settled in the Cleveland, OH, area, where, for a time, Brett attended Richmond Heights High School.

Brett adapted well to new environments and knew how to quickly make new friends. People liked Brett; they were drawn to him. He had a great sense of humor and an easy-going demeanor. The first thing people remember about Brett is his wit, his smile, his charm. His brother Derek said, "You couldn't be sad around him. He was just a funny guy."

But Brett also had a serious side. He was a smart person, a smart kid. He read a lot. In fact, he started reading at a very early age and ended up 2 years ahead in school. As his brother Sloan said, "He was always so smart. He blew away all the tests he took."

Brett was also a hard worker. His uncle remembers how he took a physically demanding job at a tropical fish farm. Each day, Brett would travel on his bike 5 miles there and 5 miles back. Rain or shine, Brett road those 10 miles to and from work, laboring tirelessly to get the job done and, yes, done well. He dreamed of opening a restaurant one day with his Richmond Heights High School buddy, Jonathan Wilke.

Brett completed his GED and decided to enlist in the U.S. Army. Brett's mom Tess said he was born to serve; that he always wanted to be a soldier. She said, "My son believed in honor, loyalty, good character, all those things."